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STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE ARAB 
BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL 
The Arab boycott of Israel confronts the American business 
community with difficult ethical and political decisions. Six states, 
led by New York, 1 have quietly enacted anti boycott laws designed 
to prevent economic trade opportunities with the Middle East from 
encouraging discrimination within their borders. 2 The laws seek to 
prohibit the discriminatory effects of the boycott, which indicates 
that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not limited to military weapons3 or 
confined to the nations of th~ Middle East. 4 More importantly, the 
states' responses signal a growing awareness that the federal gov-
ernment is unwilling to handle the complex moral, political, 
economic, and legal issues relating to the Arab boycott of Israel. 5 
This note will examine the history and nature of the boycott, the 
present federal and state statutes designed to thwart its effects, and 
the state antiboycott statutes and their accompanying practical 
problems. 
1 N. Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(13) (McKinney Supp. I 976) makes it an "unlawful discriminat- · 
ory practice ... for any person to discriminate against, boycott or blacklist or to refuse to 
buy from. sell to or trade with, any person, because of the race, creed, color, national origin 
or sex of such person, or of such person's partners, members, stockholders ... business 
associates. suppliers or customers." It has been referred to by its author's name, Assem-
blyman Joseph F. Lisa. 
2 See, e.g., 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 366, at 1247 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 ½, §§ 
196, 200; ch. 29, §§ 91-96; ch. 38, § 60-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); Mo. CoM. LAW CooE 
ANN.§§ I l-2A0I - ll-2Al5 (Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297; N.Y. EXEC. 
LAW§ 296(13) (McKinney Supp. 1976); Omo REv. CooE ANN.§§ 1129.11, 1153.05, 
1331.01-.03, 1331.08, 1331.10-1331.11, 1707.44, 2307.832 (Baldwin 1976). Florida (H.B. 
2713, Reg. Sess. 1976), Michigan (H.B. 6039-6043, Reg. Sess. 1976, and S.B. Nos. 1297-
1301. Reg. Sess. 1976), and Pennsylvania (H.B. 2348) ( 1976) are considering similar legisla-
tion. A resolution was introduced in the Pennsylvania legislature, H.R. 293( 1976), calling 
upon the federal government to enact legislation prohibiting discriminatory effects of the 
Arab boycott. 
3 See L. PRESTON, TRADE PATTERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 49-51 (1970). For a general 
discussion of the economic impact of boycott agreements, see Bouve, The National Boycott 
as an International Delinquency, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 19 (1934); Lauterpacht, Boycott in 
International Relations, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 125 (1933). For recent articles on the 
American response to the Arab boycott, see Schwartz, The Arab Boycott and American 
Responses: Antitrust Law or Executive Discretion, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1260 (1976); Note. The 
Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott, 74 MICH. L. REV. 795 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Antitrust Implications]; Note, Export Policy, Antitrust and the Arab Boycott, 51 N .Y. U.L. 
REV. 94 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Export Policy]. 
4 The Canadians have recognized the discriminatory effects of the Arab boycott within 
their borders. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1976, at A-7, col. I. 
5 See HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL AGENCY 
ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND POLICIES AGAINST COMPLIANCE BY BANKS AND OTHER U.S. 
FIRMS WITH THE ARAB BOYCOTT, 31ST REPORT, 94th Cong .. 2d. Sess. (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as BANKS AND THE BOYCOTT]. 
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I. THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL 
A. A Historical View 
The Arab boycott of Israel has had two phases: the first involves 
the direct and primary boycott of Israel, and the second has been 
. fostered by the new Arab wealth due to the fourfold increase in the 
price of oil after the Yorn Kippur War. 6 The primary boycott began 
when the Arab-Jewish dispute over Palestine became increasingly 
polarized over the proposed formation of the Jewish state of Is-
rael. 7 In October 1945, shortly after the formation of the Arab 
League, 8 the primary boycott was formalized. In 1955, the Arab 
League organized the Central Boycott Office in Damascus to coor-
dinate economic pressures against Israel, as developed by the Arab 
League Council. 9 
Relatively unnoticed in the United States until 1973, 10 the 
boycott catapulted to world prominence in the wake of the dramat-
ic rise in Arab wealth following the l 973 oil embargo, which forced 
many companies to reconsider the nature of their trade relation-
ships with both Israel and the Arab nations .11 The petrodollar 
bonanza moved the boycott from its primary military and 
6 Guzzardi. That Curious Behavior in the Arab Frontiers,· FORTUNE, July 1975, at 82; The 
Arab Blacklist, THE NATION, Mar. 15, 1975, at 292. 
7 L. Preston, supra note 3. at 51. See also HOUSE SuBCOMM. OF OVERSIGHT AND 
INVESTIGATION OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, THE ARAB 
BOYCOTT AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT). 
8 See generally R. MACDONALD, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (1965). 
9 Since the founding of the Arab League Council, the initial boycott rules have been 
frequently amended. See Hearings on Multinational Corporations and United States 
Foreign Policy Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Sen. Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 442 (1975) (General Principles for the Boycott of 
Israel, June 1972) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Hearings]. noting the dates of successive 
amendments as the Arabs grew stronger and bolder. 
Council meetings have resulted in a degree of confusion as to what the rules are at any 
given time. Adding to the confusion is the heterogeneous character of the rules. which differ 
for various types of activity-industry, trade, tourism, shipping. insurance, etc. Id. at 372. 
Finally; there has been a pragmatic tendency to relax the rules when such action is beneficial 
to the Arab states. See note 30 and accompanying text infra. 
'° One of the initial attempts to expand the boycott occurred in 1965 when some Arab 
nations attempted to force Chase Manhattan Bank to comply with the boycott by demanding 
that the bank close its Israeli branches. Chase defied the Arabs and continued its extensive 
involvement in the Middle East. Hearings on S. 948 to Amend Section 2 of the Export 
Control Act of 1949 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong .. !st 
Sess. 28 (1965) [hereinafter cited as /965 Hearings]. 
11 The Arab-dominated Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has be-
come a force that Western countries can no longer ignore. 1974 OPEC revenues were 
estimated at $105 billion; $55 billion was available for foreign investments and the remainder 
was available to purchase goods and services. See 121 CONG. REC. H6579-81 (daily ed. July 
10, 1975) (testimony of Rep. Holtzman); see also Wall St. J .• Feb. 18, 1977, at 8, col. 1-2. 
There is some evidence that high oil prices and the recent recession in the West have 
reduced the demand for Arab oil, causing a drop in OPEC revenues during late 1975. that 
will continue for several years. See Samuelson. Too Little Too Late, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 3. 
1976, at 12; THE EcoNOMIST, Feb. 14, 1976, at 84. Nevertheless. it is predicted that over the 
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economic focus into a second stage. The boycott is still directed 
towards Israel, but its evolution has created a wide range of moral, 
economic, and political questions in the United States. 
B. An Overview of the Boycott 
The Arab boycott of Israel operates on three levels. In its pri-
mary aspects it forbids all direct trade between Arab states and 
Israel, but this effort has not been completely successful. 12 The 
practice of one state boycotting another is one traditional 
technique for exerting economic pressure to achieve desired 
goals. 13 The Arab boycott of Israel, however, represents the first 
modern attempt to impose and enforce secondary and tertiary 
boycotts .14 The secondary boycott is in tended to bar from the Arab 
world all businesses that the Arabs believe have contributed mate-
rially to the strength of Israel. 15 
Through the tertiary or extended secondary boycott, 16 some 
next several years the Arab countries will accumulate vast sums of investment capital. See 
N.Y. Times. Jan. 4. 1975. at 2. col. I (describing massive Saudi Arabian development and 
construction projects planned for the next five years). This capital is presently being used in 
ambitious peacetime construction programs. and for eager American construction firms 
involved. there are rich rewards to be earned. but there are also immense difficulties 
including the possibility of antitrust attacks in the United States growing out of the Arab 
boycott. For example. the Bechtel Corp .. the fourth largest contracting firm in the United 
States. has signed a $9 billion contract with the Saudi Arabian government to oversee the 
construction of an industrial city. McQuade, The Arabian Building Boom is Making Con-
struction History. FORTUNE, Sept. 1976, at I 13. The corporation was subsequently sued by 
the United States for alleged antitrust violations. See note 40 and accompanying text infra. 
12 Farm produce does cross the lsraeli-Jon:lan frontier. The Israelis like to exaggerate the 
amount of forbidden commerce, and the Arabs prefer to claim that it is nonexistent. What 
appears evident is that the primary boycott is generally respected. largely effective, and not 
a source of dispute among Arab states. Guzzardi. supra note 6, at 84. 
13 Other techniques include export and import embargoes. licensing systems, blacklisting, 
prohibitions on reexportation. preemptive buying. controls on shipping, foreign exchange 
controls. and the blocking and freezing of assets. See ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 7. 
at 9. Techniques of economic warfare were used with increasing sophistication during the 
two world wars. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANA, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD ORDER 30 
( I 961), and are generally considered to be .. legitimate exercises of sovereignty. not contrary 
to international law." w. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1033-34 n. 232 (3d ed. 1971). See 
generally Bowett. International Lm1· and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245 (1976); 
Muir. The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L LAW AND EcoN. 187 (1974); Paust & 
Blaustein. The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 
(1974). 
14 For example. the United States has not required other countries to boycott Cuba as a 
condition of being able to do business in this country. See ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT, supra 
note 7. at 10. For a history of recent international economic controls. see Lowenfield. Sauce 
for the Gander, a paper delivered at the Conference on Transnational Economic Boycotts 
and Coercion. Feb. 19-20, 1976 at the University of Texas School of Law, Houston, Texas. 
cited in ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 7. at 10 n.27. 
15 Guzzardi. supra note 5, at 84. See also notes 24-26 infra for a consideration of what is 
materially contributing to the Israeli strength. 
16 Prior to 1973. only the primary and secondary boycotts existed. See ARAB B·oYCOTT 
REPORT, supra note 7. at 10; Steiner. International Boycotts and Domestic Order: American 
lnml1·ement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1355, 1367-70 (1976). 
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Arab nations refuse to deal with companies with pro-Israeli inter-
ests.17 In order to implement and monitor this boycott, the Arab 
League's Boycott Office maintains a blacklist of pro-Israeli busi-
nesses.18 As a military weapon, the Arab boycott has not affected 
the United States. On the other hand, the secondary and tertiary 
boycotts are acts of "foreign economic blackmail" 19 that encour-
age the participation of American businesses in the continuing 
Middle Eastern conflict. 
C. The Mechanics of the Boycott 
The governing body for the boycott, the Arab League Council, 
holds biannual conferences, adopts legislative resolutions for the 
Arab League, issues authoritative interpretations of the boycott 
rules, supervises central and regional offices, and operates an 
international espionage system that reports suspected violations of 
boycott rules. 20 Although the Council governs the boycott, the 
Central Boycott Office coordinates boycott activities. 21 Through a 
study of trade journals, the collection of hearsay information, and 
the distribution of questionnaires to foreign businesses,22 the Of-
17 The tertiary boycott involves requesting a neutral person" A'" not to do business with 
"B" because "B" does business with or otherwise supports Israel. ARAB BOYCOTT RE-
PORT, supra note 7. at I. 
18 It has been reported that there are approximately 1500 entries on the master blacklist, 
but without knowing how many Arab nations have individual blacklists and the number of 
entries on such lists, it is difficult to determine the true extent of the blacklist. ARAB 
BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 7, at 37. Entries include the Xerox Corporation, Allstate 
Insurance Company, and Ford Motor Company. See note 24 infra. Recent blacklisted 
additions include the Glen Alden Corporation (for acquiring the blacklisted International 
Latex Corp.), Monsanto Corp., United Artists Corp., and American Motors Corp. 1975 
Senate Hearings, rnpra note 9, at 373. Foreign companies and institutions are considered 
pro-Israeli if their operations support the Israeli economy. See note 26 and accompanying 
text infra. Despite the easing of the boycott, the blacklist continues to grow, as the number 
of companies added exceeds the number removed from the blacklist. 1975 Senate Hearings, 
supra note 9, at 573. See also note 29 and accompanying text infra. 
19 N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1976, at 38, col. I. Cf. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1976, at 14 
(advertisement noting that the boycott pits Americans against Americans to achieve Arab 
goals). 
20 The surveillance is conducted by diplomatic and consular representatives of the various 
regional offices of the Arab League boycott organization. /975 Senate Hearings, supra note 
9. at 442-44. One indication that the reports are inadequate can be found in the boycott 
compliance requests received by pro-Israeli companies, an action contrary to the rationale 
of the boycott. N. Y. Times, Oct. 20, I 976, at II, col. I. 
21 L. PRESTON, supra note 3, at 51. 
22 The practice of demanding information through questionnaires was challenged in 1965 
by a bill introduced in the Congress seeking to criminalize responses to the questionnaires. 
See /965 Senate Hearings, supra note 10. The amendment finally approved by Congress 
encouraged. but did not mandate, refusal to comply with the boycotters' requests for 
information. See Export Administration Act. 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 2401-2413 (1970 & Supp. V 
1975). Nevertheless, it did require that such requests be reported to the Department of 
Commerce. Export Administration Act § 46, 50 U .S.C. App. § 2403(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
Between 1970 and 1974. exporters reported 44,709 transactions involving Arab requests for 
discriminatory practices against Israel. 121 CONG. REC. H6580 (daily ed. July JO, 1975) 
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fice assembles a master list of businesses whose connections with 
Israel are considered detrimental to Arab interests. This master 
blacklist is disseminated to member states, many of which have 
boycott departments within their economic or commercial gov-
ernment bureaucracy. 23 
A blacklisted business cannot trade with an Arab state 24 and the 
same business may discover that it is ostracized in its business 
dealings in the United States as well. 25 According to official 
boycott regulations and policy statements, activities that can result 
in blacklisting include the maintenance of factories, assembly 
plants, agencies, or offices in Israel; the sale of licenses, 
trademarks, or technical assistance to Israeli businesses; the use of 
parts or materials produced by the blacklisted firm; and the con-
duct of normal trade with Israel, especially through the importation 
of Israeli goods. 26 The boycott is carried out in a variety of 
(testimony of Rep. Holtzman). Undoubtedly many more requests for information have gone 
unreported. On Jan. 19, 1977, the Department of Commerce reported that six American 
companies had been fined for failure to report boycott requests in violation of the Export 
Administration Act. Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1977, at 4, col. 2. An anonymous Commerce 
Department source stated that, in most of the estimated 50,000 transactions with Arab 
countries since 1970, Americans have complied with Arab demands. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 
IO. 1975, at 7, col. I. 
23 For ex.ample, in Lebanon the boycott office is part of the Ministry of National 
Economy. See GRASSMUCK & K. SALIBI, A MANUAL OF REFORMED ADMINISTRATION 
82 (1957). 
24 The United States portion of the Saudi Arabian "Directory of Boycotted Foreign 
Countries and Establishments for 1970" contained over 1800 entries. The list included an 
extraordinary number and range of American enterprises from obscure gift and pet shops to 
giant firms like Ford Motor Company (but not General Motors or the Chrysler Corporation), 
Sears Roebuck & Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Burlington Industries, Xerox 
Corporation and Zenith Radio Corporation. Numerous noncommercial firms are included, 
for example, the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith. Also included were the puzzling entries of Boston, Massachusetts. and Miami, 
Florida. No international oil companies were included. See /975 Senate Hearings, supra 
note 9, at 224, 374-441. The effects of blacklisting are clear. Boycott rules, however, have 
been relaxed for companies willing to make substantial investments in Arab nations. /975 
Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 372-73. Although Ford Motor Co. has not sold a car or 
truck in the Middle East since 1%6, id. at 195, it has entered a joint venture with the 
Egyptian government to build trucks and traitors in Egypt. Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1975, at 2, 
col. 3. 
25 The practical effect of Arab blacklisting is twofold. First, it informs the blacklisted 
company that it cannot do business with Arab League members, and secondly, it notifies 
persons who do business with Arab nations to comply with the boycott rules and refuse to 
do business with blacklisted companies. See notes 17 and 24 supra. 
26 L. PRESTON, supra note 3, at 51-52. The regulations can be catalogued into seven 
classes: 
I. Origin of Goods clause requires a company to certify and affirm that the exported goods 
are not of Israeli origin or are wholly of U.S. origin; 
2. The Israeli Clause requires a company to certify that it neither has ~ny subsidiaries or 
branches located in Israel nor is it substantially contributing to the Israeli economy; 
3. The Shipping Clause requires certification that a company is neither using a blacklisted 
transportation line, nor is it using a vessel that will stop at an Israeli port in transit; 
4. The Insurance Clause requires certification that the insurance company underwriting 
the exports is not blacklisted; 
5. The Blacklisted Companies Clause requires certification that a company does not or 
will not do business with a blacklisted company; 
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ways, 27 but it remains subject to the volition of each Arab state. 28 
Whether the boycott will be enforced depends on the "best inter-
ests" of the individual states, so that some businesses appearing on 
the master blacklist are not necessarily included on individual 
states' blacklists. 29 Businesses critical to an Arab economy are 
unlikely to be blacklisted. Blacklisted firms may defy or comply 
with the boycott or buy their way off the blacklist. 30 None of the 
methods for getting off the blacklist, however, guarantees that the 
business will be accepted in trading with Arab countries. 
II. AMERICAN RESPONSES 
American responses to the Arab boycott are twofold. The fed-
eral government has moved cautiously to prevent discriminatory 
effects of the Arab boycott in a variety of ways. Additionally, some 
states have responded to discriminatory effects within their bor-
ders by antiboycott statutes. 
6. The Religious-Ethnic Clause requests the company to give information regarding the 
religious affiliation of the personnel of any American company and reference to individual 
beliefs in Zionism, such as "Zionist tendencies;" 
7. The General Clause, a catchall provison requires companies to certify that they will 
"'observe the rules of the Arab boycott" or "otherwise comply with the boycott." See /975 
Senate Hearings, supra note 9, at 449-53; ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 7, at 33-37. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait recently announced that they were relaxing their boycott 
restrictions by eliminating the requirement that an exporter certify that the goods are of 
nonlsraeli origin. (1977) 144 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) A-2. 
27 The boycott extends to the banning of Jews from certain Arab states. /975 Senate 
Hearings, supra note 9, at 215-20 (Saudi exclusion of Jews). See also Hearings on S. 425, 
Amend. No. 24 Thereto; S. 953, S. 995, and S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on International 
Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., Isl 
Sess. 281-86 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 425] (efforts of Dubai, now the 
United Arab Emirates, to recruit American teachers, excluding anyone who has a "Jewish 
surname or who is an American Jew or who has Jewish ancestors"). 
28 Guzzardi, supra note 6, at 84. Principle 15 (First) of the Arab League boycott prohibits 
dealings with blacklisted companies only when regulations have been issued by the indi-
vidual Arab states. /975 Senate Hearings, supra note 9 at 449. See Hearings on Dis-
criminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business Before the Subcom. on International Trade 
and Commerce of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 
(1975) (discussing variations of enforcement among the Arab states) [hereinafter cited as 
1975 House Hearings]. 
29 The startling ad hoc exceptions to the boycott rules made by some Arab states, in order 
to serve their individual interests, are indicative of the uneven adherence to the boycott. 
Many American defense industries continue to sell weaponry to Israel even though they 
should be blacklisted for giving material aid to the enemy. They have all been omitted 
because of compelling Arab interests in purchasing the best weaponry possible, irrest,ective 
of the boycott. The convenient rationale is that the purchase contract is made with the 
Department of Defense. Guzzadi, supra note 6, at 168. Many businesses carry on operations 
with both sides in the Middle East, but their Israeli operations go unnoticed when the Arabs 
protect other. higher interests. For example. Hertz is blacklisted but it maintains outlets in 
Israel and Egypt. Id. See also ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 7. at 38. 
30 Getting off the blacklist is difficult. awkward, and sometimes costly. See Id. at 38-40. 
One report indicates that $25,000-40,000 bribes to Arab officials may be effective. N. Y. 
Times. Dec. 20. 1976. at D-1, col. I. 
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A. Federal Approaches 
In 1975, President Ford announced that the United States would 
"not countenance the translation of any foreign prejudice into 
domestic discrimination against American citizens. " 31 New regula-
tions were issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 
1969,32 forbidding exporters and related service organizations from 
complying with boycott requests when compliance would discrim-
inate against Americans on the basis ofrace, religion, color, sex, or 
national origin.33 
Federal banking agencies have called upon member banks to 
pronounce ethnic and religious discrimination caused by the Arab 
boycott as incompatible with the ''public service function of 
American financial institutions. " 34 The Securities and Exchange 
Commission issued a warning "reiterating the United States' pol-
icy of opposition to discriminatory practices against United States 
citizens or businesses resulting from foreign boycotts. " 35 Legisla-
31 White House Release of President Gerald Ford's statement, 11 WEEKLY CoMP. OF 
PRES. Doc. 1305 (Nov. 20, 1975). 
32 Export Administration Act. Pub. L. No. 91-184, §§ 1-13. 83 Stat. 841 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 2401-2413 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). 
aa 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1976), amending 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1975). The Secretary of Commerce 
acted pursuant to authority delegated to him under 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2403(b)(I), (d) (1970 & 
Supp. V 1975). 
34 See BANKS AND THE BOYCOTT, supra note 5, at 23--27. The Federal Reserve Board, the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are the 
regulatory agencies involved. See id. The agencies' actions concerning the effect of the 
boycott has been limited to the circulation of letters warning banks under their jurisdiction 
not to participate in the boycott. Initially, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur Bums 
warned the 5800 member banks not to participate "even passively," in boycotting countries 
friendly to the United States by the honoring of conditions in letters of credits requiring 
payees to certify compliance with the boycott. Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1975, at 6, col. 2. This 
strong tone has mellowed; Federal Reserve Board banks were notified that Mr. Bums' 
strong statement only encouraged the members to refuse to participate and did not prohibit 
participation with the boycott. Letter from Theodore E. Allison, Secretary of the Federal 
Reserve System, to the Federal Reserve Institutions (Jan. 20, 1976) (on file with U. MICH. 
J.L. REF.) 
The importance of the letters must not be underestimated in light of the vast regulatory 
authority of the federal banking agencies. While it is unclear whether any agency could 
discipline a participant of the boycott, each agency recognizes that American banks have 
"public service functions" which could create legal obligations beyond the explicit statutory 
language. See BANKS AND THE BOYCOTT, supra- note 5, at 23-27. 
35 Securities Exchange Act Release No. I 1860 (Nov. 20, 1975), cited in [1975] 329 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-17. Where a COIJlpany participates in the boycott, disclosure in 
reports or registration statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission is only 
required where the information is "material" to investors. For example, if compliance with 
the conditions in a boycott request would have a material adverse effect upon the income, 
assets, or profits of the company, disclosure of the relevant facts is required. Similarly, if 
breach of the condition, or disclosure of the fact that the company had complied with the 
boycott, would result in a material adverse effect on the company s business, disclosure is 
also required. See BANKS AND THE BOYCOTT, supra note 5, at 27-30. For a general summary 
on S.E.C. activities concerning the Arab boycott, see letter from S.E.C. Chairman Roderick 
M. Hills to Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (June I, 1976) (on file with the U. MICH. J .L. REF.). 
The S.E.C. has also announced that it will no longer support companies trying to evade 
disclosure of their boycott activities when pressured by stockholder resolutions. N.Y. 
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tion was proposed in Congress to prohibit any business from using 
economic means in coercing any person or entity to discriminate 
against American persons or entities on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 36 
The new federal policy does not reach beyond racial. religious, 
or similar types·of discrimination. An exporter could still decline to 
buy from blacklisted businesses for reasons other than personal 
discrimination. The proposed legislation designed to outlaw "coer-
cion" was similarly circumscribed and would be of limited utility 
since the discriminatory effects are achieved mainly by acquies-
cence in Arab decisions to blacklist businesses on the basis of 
"Zionist sympathies." 
I. Antitrust Laws-The Commerce Department, in recent regu-
lations, asserted that compliance with the secondary boycott may 
constitute a violation of federal antitrust laws. 37 Section One of the 
Sherman Act38 has been selected by the federal government as the 
Times. Feb. 19. 1977, at 29. col. I. In reply to that announcement. Pfizer, Inc.. has 
announced that it would comply and supply the data such a resolution would have required 
in a post-meeting report to its stockholders. For a discussion on stockholder resolutions. see 
note 71 infra. -
36 H. R. 11488, 94th Cong .. 2d Sess. ( 1976). Other bills are designed to prohibit discrimina-
tion on racial. religious or sexual grounds. E.g., S. 92, 95th Cong., I st Sess. ( 1977) (Proxmire 
bill); S. 953, 94th Cong., I st Sess. ( 1975) (Stevenson bill): S. 425. 94th Cong .. I st Sess. ( 1975) 
(Williams bill); H.R. 5840. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Zablocki bill): H.R .. 5246, 94th 
Cong .. 1st Sess. (1975) (Holtzman-Rodino bill); H.R. 4967. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) 
(Drinan bill). See Steiner. supra note 16, at 1380-84. The Congress is contemplating legisla-
tion. S. 92. 95th Cong .. 1st Sess. (1977) (Proxmire bill). that would prohibit companies from 
participating in the Arab boycott. even if it resulted in the loss of jobs. N. Y. Times. Feb. 22. 
1977. at 7. col. 4; [1977) 140 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) N-1, A-1. The Carter Administra-
tion is preparing to introduce stringent legislation to combat the effects of the boycott. N. Y. 
Times. Mar. I. 1977. at I. col. 6. indicating a reversal of the Ford Administration's emphasis 
on quiet diplomacy. N.Y. Times, Sept. I. 1976, at 19. col. 2. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
will direct the White House's aggressive antiboycott policy, but his initial action has been to 
ask Congress to consider scrapping its various bills in order to combat the boycott uni-
formly. N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1977, at A-7. col. I. 
37 The regulation states: 
All exporters and related service organizations engaged or involved in the export or 
negotiations leading to the export from the United States of commodities, services, 
or information, ... are encouraged and requested to refuse to take any action, 
including the furnishing of information or the signing of agreements that have the 
effect of furthering or supporting other restrictive trade practices or boycotts 
fostered or imposed by foreign countries .... It should be ·noted that the boycot-
ting of a U.S. firm by another US.firm in order to comply with a restrictive trade 
practice by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the United States 
may constitute a 1•iolation of United States antitrust laws. 
15 C.F.R. § 369.3(a) (1976), amending 15 C.F.R. § 369.1-4 (1975) (emphasis added). Before 
Dec. I. 1975. the regulations gave no indication that compliance with the secondary boycott 
might entail a violation of the antitrust laws and declared only that compliance was contrary 
to American policy but was not expressly prohibited by the Export Administration Act. IY 
C.F.R. § 369. t (1975). 
38 15 U .S.C. § I (Supp. V 1975) prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies "in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations." For 
general discussions of the Arab boycott and the antitrust laws. see generally Areeda. 
Remarks on the Arab Bovcott. 54 TEX. L. REV. 1432 (1976); Baker, Antitrust Remedies 
Against Go1·ernment-lnsp.ired Boycotts. Shortages and Squeezes: Wandering on the Road 
to Mecca. 61 CORNELL L. REV. 91 I (1976); Kestenbaum, The Antitrust Challenge to the 
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vehicle to resolve the issues posed'"by the secondary boycott. The 
classic case arises when an Arab corporation finalizes a trade 
agreement with a business operating in the United States. The 
trade pact is contingent upon the American firm's agreement not to 
trade either with Israel or with businesses trading with Israel, 
whether or not they are on any offical blacklist. 39 The American 
business, in implementing the trade pact, either severs or refuses to 
deal with the targeted entities. 
The recently settled Bechtel suit, 40 the first federal effort to 
enforce the anti boycott policy, establishes the principle that com-
pliance with the boycott may subject participating companies to 
antitrust liability. Given the large number of businesses complying 
with the boycott41 and the limited resources of the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice,42 an aggressive enforcement 
effort directed against secondary boycotts seems unlikely. 
Nonetheless, a selective enforcement strategy may have a signifi-
cant impact,43 and private litigation seeking to enforce stated anti-
trust policy may prove a viable supplement to the Division's ac-
tivities. 44 
Arab Boycott: Per Se Theory. Middle East Politics. and United States v. Bechtel Corpora-
tion. 54 TEx. L. REV. 141 I (1976); Schwartz, supra note 3. at 1272-85; Export Policy, supra 
note 3, at 106-31; Antitrust Implications, supra note 3, at 798-817. 
39 See note 26 supra. 
40 United States v. Bechtel Corporation, Civ. No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal.. filed Jan. 16, 1976) 
reported in [ I 976] 747 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-8. Both parties signed 
consent decrees after Bechtel agreed not to cooperate with the Arab boycott. Immediately 
afterwards, Bechtel claimed it had not engaged in any discriminatory practices and had not 
violated any other federal laws. N.Y. Times, Jan. II, 1977, at 41, col. 2. 
41 See note 22 supra. 
42 The Antitrust Division employs a staff of about three hundred lawyers and operates on 
a budget of approximately six million dollars a year. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 383 (2d ed. 1970). The Federal Trade Commission is also 
involved in antitrust enforcement and assigns approximately three hundred professionals to 
the task. Id. at 835. For a discussion of the Antitrust Division's enforcement record in light 
of its restricted budget from 1960-1974, see Hadler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an 
Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 211, 232-37 (1975). 
43 See A. NEALE, supra note 42, at 374. Selective enforcement may result in consent 
decrees or judicial opinions offering guidance to corporate lawyers. Id. at 373. The office of 
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division has changed hands frequently 
in recent years thus amplifying the problems of policy continuity. Id. 
The Carter Administration is apparently taking an aggressive antiboycott stance and this 
may signal stronger enforcement measures. N.Y. Times, Mar. I, 1977, at I, col. 2 (1977); 
[1977] 142 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) A-1, M-1 (the Justice Department's issuance of an 
"Antitrust Guide for International Operations"). This policy may be thwarted by the 
Supreme Court's "new antitrust" majority, see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 
418 U.S. 602, 642 (1974) (White, J., dissenting), who are restricting the proliferation of 
antitrust remedies by insisting on tougher factual standards of proof. See United States v. 
General Dynamics Cqrp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
44 Any person whose business or property is injured by reason of anything forbidden in 
the federal antitrust laws may sue and recover treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). A 
claimant need only show that he is within the sector of the economy in which the antitrust 
violations threatened a breakdown of competitive conditions, and that he was proximately 
injured thereby. South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 
358 (9th Cir., 1955). 
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It is also possible that a corporate stockholder could m1tiate a 
derivative action to enjoin alleged antitrust violations ensuing from 
his corporation's compliance with the boycott request. 45 A deriva-
tive cause of action may be grounded on the perceived need to 
prevent a corporation from risking liability that could result be-
cause a competitor or blacklisted business is damaged by a refusal 
to deal. 46 Aside from issues of standing and security-for-costs, 47 
the problems of proof and jurisdiction that arise in such a deriva-
tive suit may obstruc.t the path of a stockholder-plaintiff. 48 
The more likely private plaintiff is a business injured by an 
American business' compliance with the boycott. The corporation 
would need significant financial and legal resources to make the 
risk and financial burden of antitrust litigation worthwhile. 49 In 
contrast, determining the identity of the defendant is less trouble-
some than the finding of a suitable plaintiff. As the legal and 
practical problems of suing Arab defendants make suit against the 
boycott instigator futile, the probable defendant would be an 
American business complying with the boycott. 50 
45 See Clayton Act§ 16. 15 U .S.C. § 26 (1970). See generally Harris, Derivative Actions 
Based Upon Alleged Antitrust Violations: Trap for the Unwary, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 337 
(1971). Corporations participating in the Arab boycott may also face securities law disclo-
sure problems if their activities would have a material adverse effect on the income. assets. 
or profits of the corporation. or on the investors. See note 35 supra. 
46 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U .S.C. § 15 ( 1970), authorizes a private suit for treble 
damages by any person injured by a violation of the antitrust laws. "Person" has been 
interpreted to include foreign governments. See, e.g., In re Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 
315, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (permitting Kuwait to sue under the antitrust laws in order to 
strengthen private enforcement). The privilege accorded to foreign governments of suing in 
United States courts has been denied only to America's wartime enemies. See Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 409 (1964). Indeed, governments whose 
relations with the United States have been characterized as unfriendly have been permitted 
access to American courts. Id. at 4 IO. Theoretically the State of Israel could bring an action 
against American businesses violating the Sherman Act. 
47 Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), authorizes "[a]ny person, firm, 
corporation or association" to sue for injunctive relief against "threatened loss or damage" 
stemming from a violation of the antitrust laws. Accordingly, it has been said: 
To have standing, the private litigant must demonstrate a significant threat of injury 
to himself. But where the anticompetitive effect potential of the defendant's be-
havior would warrant an injunction in the Government's suit, the court may well 
forbid it without close scrutiny of the harm claimed by the private plaintiff. 
P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 57 (2d ed. 1974). citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969). 
Security-for-costs problems confront plaintiffs who bring antitrust-grounded derivative 
suits. The plaintiff must either hold five percent of the outstanding stock of the corporation 
or the plaintiff may be required to give security for reasonable expenses, including attor-
ney's fees which it may incur. The amount of security will be determined by the court having 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 627 (McKinney Supp. 1976). 
48 An extensive trial may be required for the plaintiff in a derivative action to prove both 
that the antitrust laws were violated and that the defendant knew or should have known of 
the violations. Harris. supra note 45, at 342. In addition. the plaintiff must properly 
determine the forum in which to bring the action. Id. at 343-47. 
49 See note 47 supra: L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 770-74, 
785-87 (1977). 
50 A foreign corporation which complies with the boycott may violate the Sherman Act, 
yet it may be difficult to subject a foreign defendant, without United States offices. to 
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In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could file suit 
under Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act to pro-
scribe as an "unfair method of competition " 51 the same boycott 
activities which could be the subject of an antitrust complaint, even 
if the practice is not held to violate the Sherman Act. In Federal 
Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 52 the Court up-
held determinations that under Section Five, the FTC could re-
strain unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive prac-
tices if they violated the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws. 53 The 
FTC's authority to promulgate rules defining unfair practices54 
further enhances the federal government's ability to prevent sec-
ondary and tertiary boycotts. 
2. Discrimination-Employment discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, or sex is prohibited by the Constitution,55 
executive orders,56 and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 57 
Arguably the discrimination involved in screening out Jews, who 
by foreign law would not have access to the situs of the job, 
involves a work qualification rather than racial or religious motives 
imposed on American businesses. 58 Acceptance of this interpreta-
tion would, however, undermine a cherished constitutional protec-
American process and discovery even if subject matter jurisdiction is obtained. The likeli-
hood of a foreign business submitting voluntarily to suit in a United States court is slight. 
Moreoever, government-owned Arab corporations may request State Department certifica-
tion to exempt themselves from suit in American court under the sovereign immunity 
dcx:'trine. While a thorough study of the doctrine is beyond the scope of this note, it should 
be emphasized that State Department certification of sovereign immunity is ordinarily 
refused for normal commercial transactions. A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LowENFIELD, 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS I 14-16 (1967). If the State Department refuses certifica-
tion, a court is unlikely to be sympathetic to a claim of sovereign immunity, see Republic of 
Mexico v. Hoffmann, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945), although it may look to the State Department's 
criteria for guidance. See, e.g., Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abas-
tecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-59 (2d Cir., 1967), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 
(1965). See also United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 
(S.D.N.Y. 1929); Kinter and Hallgarter, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to 
Foreign Trade and Commerce-Variations on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. IND. 
& CoM. L. REv. 343, 344 (1973); Lowenfield, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal 
for Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 901 (1969). 
51 Federal Trade Commission Act§ 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). 
52 405 U.S. 233 (1972). 
53 /d. at 244. The Supi:eme Court refused to sustain the F.T.C.'s cease-and-desist order 
against the defendant for unfairly attempting to suppress the operation of trading stamp 
exchanges and other "free and open" redemption of stamps because the Commission failed 
to prove that the defendant's conduct violated the spirit or letter of the antitrust laws. 
54 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970). 
55 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
56 E.g .. Exec. Order No. 11478, 3 c.'F.R. 214 (1973), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970); Exec. 
Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1973). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). 
57 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1970). For a discussion of employment discrimination 
and Title VII, see Note, The Arab Boycott and Title Vil, 12 HARV. C.R.--C.L. L. REv. 181 
(1977). 
58 This position has been disavowed by the Department of Justice in a letter from 
Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia to David A. Brody, Director of the Anti-
~famation League of B'nai B'rith, reprinted in Hearings on S. 425, sllpra note 27, at 166. 
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tion to the benefit of a business complying with the boycott. On the 
other hand, no federal legislation, with the possible exception of 
the antitrust laws, prohibits private parties from discriminating 
among their suppliers and contractors on racial, religious, or sexual 
grounds.59 A number of proposed bills seek to close this gap. 60 
3. Disclosure Responsibility-The antiboycott provisions of the 
Export Administration Act61 (EAA) hav~ three basic elements. 
First, a statement is made that it is the policy of the United States 
to oppose the Arab boycott as an economic weapon against Israel, 
and to encourage domestic concerns not to participate in any stage 
of the boycott. 62 Second, American companies are required to 
report any boycott requests to the Secretary of Commerce for 
59 Assistant Attorney General Scalia declared: 
There are no generally applicable federal civil rights laws which prohibit dis-
criminatory refusal to deal with a particular customer. The closest approach to a 
broad federal prosecution is Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. which prohibits 
the recipients of federal grants from discriminating against the intended benefic-
iaries of federally assisted programs on the grounds of race. color or national 
origin-for example. such discrimination by private hospitals which receive federal 
money. Some civil rights statutes do impose restrictions, unconnected with the 
receipt of federal money. upon particular areas of commerce-for example. Title I I 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, relating to public accommodations, and Title VIII of 
the 1968 Civil Rights Act, relating to housing. 
Hearings on S. 425. supra note 27, at 165. 
60 See note 36supra. The danger that the infusion of Arab petrodollars into the U.S. will 
lead to the expropriation of American businesses and implementation of discriminatory 
practices has evoked several congressional responses. notably S. 425, 94th Cong .. 2d Sess. 
(1976), the Foreign Investment Act of 1975 (revised in Title II of S. 953, as reported by the 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, see S. REP. No. 632, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1976). Under this bill and proposed amendment no. 24, any foreign acquisition of 
more than 5 percent of the equity securities of an American business would have to be 
disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission and might be forbidden or required to 
be divested in either a government suit or private action on the ground that the foreign 
investor "caused" specified discriminatory practices. See Hearings on S. 425, supra note 
27, at 167-70. 
61 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2413 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Export Administration Act 
lapsed on Sept. 30, 1976, when the Senate failed to complete action on a bill to amend and 
extend the law. Id. President Ford issued Exec. Order No. 11940. 41 Fed. Reg. 43707 (1976), 
to continue the existing export control regulations under the authority of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act of 1917, 12 U.S.C. § 95(a) (1970), 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 1-39 (1970 & Supp. V 
1975). a World War I emergency law that has been amended several times to give the 
President sweeping emergency powers over U.S. foreign trade and international banking 
transactions. The invocation of the Act may be invalid, however, because it was intended to 
continue a controlled program in an emergency situation, and no present emergency con-
fronts the United States. Moreover, the freedom given to the Department of Commerce by 
the Export Administration Act to issue regulations without any need for public notice or 
public participation in the rulemaking process no longer exists and any new rules, such as· 
the recent order requiring the public disclosure of the boycott requests. may be invalid under 
the due process clause of the Constitution. [1976] 128 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA SPECIAL 
REPORT) B-1 to B-7. 
62 50 U .S.C. App. § 2402(5) (Supp. V 1975). The provisions derive from a 1965 amend-
ment to the Export Control Act of 1949. See Act of June 30. 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-63. § 
3(a)(4). 79 Stat. 209. amending Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11. § 12, 63 Stat. 9 (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 2021-2032 (1970)). See also United States Department of Commerce 
Form DIB-621 (rev. Feb. 1976). 
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appropriate action. 63 Finally, certain powers and duties to prohibit 
or curtail exports have been given to the President under the Act in 
order to fulfill its objectives.64 
The reporting requirement is the key provision of the EAA. 
Unfortunately, it has failed to have a signficant impact on the 
secondary boycott because the anti boycott section of the Act has 
been interpreted by the Secretary of Commerce as merely dis-
couraging, but not absolutely prohibiting, compliance with the 
boycott. 65 The Commerce Department, which administers the Act, 
has thwarted full implementation of the anti boycott provisions and 
has encouraged boycott practices by condoning activities declared 
to be contrary to national policy or simply by ignoring discrimina-
tory practices. For example, the Department circulated trade pro-
posals containing boycott clauses to American businesses and, 
until recently, failed to require companies in reporting a boycott 
request to answer questions concerning action the company took 
as a response to a boycott request. 66 The Department has recently 
taken steps to assure stricter enforcement of the EAA and its 
accompanying regulations, thereby minimizing the subversion of 
federal policy. 67 
Ill. RECENT STATE RESPONSES 
California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and 
Ohio have recently enacted legislation designed to deter participa-
tion in the boycott,68 but the vast majority of states have taken no 
"" 50 U .S.C. App.§ 2403(b)(l) (Supp. V 1975). In addition, the Secretary is authorized to 
issue regulations to fulfill the purposes of the antiboycott section, Id. at § 2403(a) (Supp. V 
1975), and has done so. See 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1976); Export Policy, supra note 3, at 96-106 
(analysis of the regulations). 
64 The President can prohibit or curtail exports for the United States "of any articles, 
materials, or supplies, including technical data or any other information" to effectuate the 
EAA's policies as stated in 50 U.S.C. App. § 2402 (Supp. V 1975). 50 U .S.C. App. § 
2403(b)(I) (Supp. V 1975). 
65 15 C.F.R. § 369.3 (1976), amending 15 C.F.R. § 369.1 (1975). See note 37 supra. 
66 ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 7, at 28. 
67 The Department's action was stimulated by the 1976 televised Presidential debates. 
N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, I 976, at A-1, col. 4. The pressure on the Department of Commerce to 
disclose names of companies receiving and complying with boycott requests, however, 
began earlier. See N. Y. Times, May 27, 1975, at 5, col. I. Because of the recent publicity, 
the Department released the names of companies that had received boycott requests after 
Oct. 3, 1976, N .Y. Times. Oct. 19, 1976, at I, col. 6, and has issued rules requiring all Arab 
boycott requests after Oct. 3, 1976. to be made available for public scrutiny. N. Y. Times, 
Oct. 9, 1976, at I, col. I. 
68 See, e.g., 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 366, at 1247 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 ½, §§ 
196, 200; ch. 29, §§ 91-96; ch. 38, § 60-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977), Mo. CoM. LAW CooE 
ANN.§§ I 1-2AOI to 2Al5 (Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297; N.Y. ExEC. 
LAW§ 296 (13) (McKinney Supp. 1976); Omo REV. CooE ANN.§§ 1129.11, 1153.05, 
1331.01-1331.03, 1331.08, 1331.10-1331.11, 1707.44, 2307.832 (Baldwin 1976). 
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action. Some view the boycott as a delicate foreign policy issue 
best handled by the federal government,69 while others have not 
felt the boycott's impact and remain unconcerned. 70 States have 
been influenced by many factors including the power of lob-
byists, 71 boycott-induced discrimination within state borders, 72 
and the apparent indifference of the federal government to the 
problem. 73 
A. The Antiboycott Statutes 
Euphemistically referred to as the antiboycott laws, the state 
laws are actually civil rights statutes prohibiting racial or religious 
discrimination. Provisions in each of the statutes make unlawful 
knowing participation in a discriminatory boycott or practice, or 
knowing aid or assistance of any other person in participating in a 
discriminatory boycott. 74 
•• See e.g. Letter from Joseph A. Lefante. Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly to the 
author (Sept. 17. 1976) (on file with the U. MICH. J.L. REF.) 
70 The majority of states may not feel the effects of the boycott. Several states, however, 
have proposed legislation similar to the intial six antiboycott states. See note 2 supra. 
71 Many Jewish organizations, especially the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 
have been active in California, Massachusetts, and New York. Their efforts have extended 
beyond lobbying and include the publication and distribution of materials concerning the 
boycott. See, e.g., "If you do business in the Middle East ... remember certain practices 
are ILLEGAL." Am. Jewish Comm. (Apr. 1976). 
The American Jewish Congress organized Operation Stockholder to force the disclosure 
of business activities in the Middle East by publicly held corporations. Shareholders are 
urged to submit resolutions for consideration at annual meetings demanding disclosure of 
the information. <::ompanies receiving shareholder resolutions must include them in their 
proxy statements or provide a written explanation to both the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the stockholders of the reasons for refusing to publish the resolutions. 
Once included in a proxy statement, all shareholders are given an opportunity to approve or 
reject the resolution. [1976) 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ,i 24,012. See also note 35 supra: 
Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1977, at 5, col. 2. 
72 A recent example of the tertiary boycott involved Sea Containers, Inc., which termi-
nated an announced joint venture with the Israeli-American Fruit Carriers shipping line 
because it did not want to provoke ill feelings in the Arab nations where it has extensive port 
operations. See N. Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1976, at D-5, col. I; see also Wash. Star, Mar. 17, 1976 
(listing three businesses complying with the Arab boycott in Maryland). 
Other than these examples, the Bechtel action, and banks complying through the issuing 
of letters of credit, no undisputed evidence is available regarding the extent of compliance 
within any states' borders. New Yori< is currently collecting information to determine the 
extent of compliance within the state. The Assembly Office of Legislative Oversight and 
Analysis, Special Report to Assemblyman Joseph F. Lisa, Chairman of the New York 
Assembly's Governmental Operations Comm., The Arab Boycott: Alive and Flourishing in 
New York, June 10, 1976, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Special Report] (on file with the U. 
MICH. J.L. REF.). Most companies have cooperated with investigations. though the General 
Electric Co .. after being subpoenaed, unsuccessfully challenged the Governmental Opera-
tions Committee's authority to collect such information. General Electric Co. v. New Yori< 
State Assembly Committee on Governmental Operations, No. 75-CV-558 (N.D.N.Y. 1975) 
(injunction denied), No. 76-7032 (2d Cir. 1977) (default judgment) (on file with the U. MICH. 
J.L. REF.). 
73 See ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 7, at 23-32. 
74 See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 366, 1247; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 16 ½. §§ 196,200, ch. 29, §§ 
91-96, ch. 38, § 60-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); Md. Comm. Law Code Ann. §§ I l-2A0I -
606 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 10:592 
Discriminatory practices are defined in a variety of ways. Gen-
erally it is illegal to enter into or carry out an expressed or implied 
provision of a contract, understanding, or arrangement which dis-
criminates against a state citizen or business on the basis of race, 
color, creed, sex, national origin, or foreign trade relationship. 75 It 
is also illegal to refuse to deal with, grant, or accept letters of credit 
or any transfers of credit which discriminate against local per-
sons. 76 The laws expressly prohibit discriminatory practices when 
foreign persons, governments, or international organizations-
Arab nations or the Arab League-are involved. 77 
The statutes are limited to discrimination, boycotting, or 
blacklisting that injures individuals or companies because of reli-
gion, race, national origin, or business associations. The laws do 
not prohibit discrimination outside the civil rights area. Because 
the laws address the tertiary boycott, they need not interfere with 
the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs. The 
provisions are an attempt to prevent federal preemption of the state 
laws which would result if they were found to be an undue burden 
on foreign or interstate commerce. 78 The statutes apply to ''per-
sons," which is defined to include individuals as well as banks and 
other financial institutions, partnerships, and-governmental agen-
cies. 79 
ll-2Al5 (Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297; N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296(13) 
(McKinney Supp. 1976); and Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§§ 1129.11, 1153.05, 1331.01-1331.03, 
1331.08, 1331.10-1331.11, 1707.44, 2307.832 (Baldwin 1976). 
75 See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1247 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 29, § 93 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1977); Mo. CoM. LAW CoDE ANN. § ll-2A02(E) (Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. ch. 297. 
76 See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1247 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 29, § 94 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1977); Mo. CoM. LAW CooE ANN. § I l-2A02 (Supp. 1976) (economic benefit 
between foreign entity and complying company); 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297; 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 296-a (McKinney 1976); Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§§ 1125.11, 1153.05, 
1331.01(6), 1331.02, 1707.44(H) (Baldwin 1976). , 
77 See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1247 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-3(5) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1977); Mo, CoM. LAW CODE ANN.§ Il-2A02 (Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. ch. 297; N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 296(13) (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CooE ANN. 
1125.11, 1153.02, 1331.01, 1331.02, 1707.44 (Baldwin 1976). 
78 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch, 29, § 96 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (severability clause); Mo. 
CoM. LAW CooE ANN,§§ I l-2A0I, (Supp. 1976) (declaration of the policy not to impede the 
free flow of commerce or Congress' regulatory power over commerce); 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. ch. 297 (does not prohibit conduct required by or expressly authorized by 
Congress); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 296 (13) (McKinney Supp. 1976). Nonetheless, the attempts 
to prevent preemption will not prevent the federal government's displacement of state 
authority if the court finds express or implied preemption. See notes I 12-33 and accompany-
ing text infra. 
79 Generally "persons" includes companies, corporations, partnerships, associations, 
governmental agencies, shipping companies, banks and other financial institutions, and 
individuals. See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 366, at 1247 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT, ch. 29, § 92 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (expressly including financial institutions, shipping companies and 
governmental agencies); Mo. CoM. LAW CODE ANN.§ I I-2A02(J) (Supp. 1976) (expressly 
including international labor organizations, educational institutions, legal representatives, 
mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, 
trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and fiduciaries); 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297; 
O_HIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 1331.0l(A) (Baldwin 1976). 
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I. Remedies-Businesses guilty of participating in a discrimina-
tory boycott risk heavy penalties for violating state law. Criminal 
penalties include a wide range of fines and prison terms.80 Private 
remedies include treble damages, court costs, and reasonable at-
torney's fees. 81 
The antiboycott statutes also provide that contracts, arrange-
ments, or combinations which result in discrimination are contrary 
to public policy, and are therefore null and void. 82 Businesses 
complying with the boycott may also be prohibited from conduct-
ing business within the state where the discriminatory act oc-
curred. 83 The penalties and remedies available lend support to 
Massachusetts Governor Dukakis' statement that the antiboycott 
laws are "a clear and unequivocal message to those who submit to 
Arab pressure tactics that we will not stand for this type of blatant 
discrimination. " 84 
2. Enforcement-State antiboycott laws provide the federal gov-
ernment, 85 state human rights commissions,86 state attorneys gen-
eral,87 and private citizens88 a role in enforcing the antiboycott 
laws. It remains to be seen, however, if the laws will actually be 
enforced. In New York, the state Human Rights Commission has 
80 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16755 (West Supp. 1976) (provide~ for fines not to 
exceed $1 million for corporate violators or for individuals a fine not to exceed $100,000 or 
imprisonment in a state prison for up to three years, one year in a county jail, or both); ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch.-38, § 60-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) ($50,000 maximum fine); Mo. CoM. 
LAW CooE ANN. §§ ll-2A07, l l-2A 11 (Supp. 1976)($50,000 fine. six months imprisonment, 
or both); N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 80.05(a), 80.10 (McKinney 1972) (a class A misdemeanor 
involving a$ 1000 fine for an individual and $5000 for a corporation, foUowing N. Y. ExEC. 
LAW§ 298(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976)); OHIO REv. CooE ANN.§ 1331.03 (Baldwin 1976) 
($500 fine for each day a violation is committed or continued after due notice is received 
from the attorney general). 
81 See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 366 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1977); Mo. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ l l-2A09, l l-2A09(B)(4) (Supp. 1976); 1976 
Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1331.08 (Baldwin 1976) (double 
damages). · , 
82 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16722 (West. 1969); Mo. CoM. LAW CooE ANN. § 
ll-2Al2 (Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297. 
83 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CooE § 16753 (West 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7(3) 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 298-a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1331.11 (Baldwin 1976). 
84 Press Release, Office of Governor Michael Dukakis (Aug. 18, 1976) (on file at the office 
of the U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
85 See Mo. CoM. LAW CooE ANN. §§ l l-2A08, 1 l-2A09(b)(I) (Supp. 1976). 
86 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 293 (McKinney Supp. 1976). 
87 See CAL. Bus & PRoF. CooE § 16755 (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38. § 60-6 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); Mo. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ I l-2A0I. I l-2A07, I l-2A08 
(Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297; OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 1331.03, 
1331.11 (Baldwin I 976). 
88 See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 366 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7(2) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1977); Mo. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-2A09(b)(2) (Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 297; N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 297 (9) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (a personal 
cause of action unless the injured party has filed a complaint with the Human Rights 
Commission); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1331.08 (Baldwin 1976). 
608 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. I 0:592 
endorsed the Lisa Law, but has also declared that it lacks sufficient 
resources for effective enforcement.89 
3. Exemptions-The Lisa Law prohibits all discriminatory prac-
tices which produce repercussions within New York state.90 The 
other states seek, however, to limit the application of their laws in 
order to prevent interference with present or future congressional 
action. An express limitation in one statute, implied in others, is 
that the law cannot interfere with American foreign policy .91 
Agreements dealing with the handling or shipping of goods and 
the choice of carrier for international transit are exempt from the 
Maryland and Massachusetts state laws92 because the primary 
boycott is a legitimate economic weapon with which the states will 
not interfere. Insofar as the primary boycott is operable, certain 
Arab requests are acceptable and can be fulfilled without violating 
any antiboycott statute.93 
In addition to the typical provisions, there are three unique 
provisions in the statutes. New York has a "long-arm" provision 
prohibiting unlawful discriminatory practices outside of the state 
against New York residents or registered corporations.94 Maryland 
requires any state official or agency of the executive department to 
report violations of the statute to the Attorney General's office.95 
The provision recognizes the difficulty of enforcement and "dep-
utizes" members of the executive department to bring violations to 
the attention of the Attorney General. In addition, Maryland rec-
ognizes that companies inadvertently violating state law will only 
be required to provide written assurance that the prohibited acts 
89 See Hearings Before the New York Assembly Standing Comm. on Governmental 
Operations. Feb. 5, 1976, statement of Werner H. Kramarsky, the Commissioner of the 
Human Rights Division, at 5-8 (on file at the U. M1cH. J.L. REF.). 
90 N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 298-a(l) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (prohibiting acts committed 
outside of the state against a state resident or registered corporation organized or authorized 
to do business in New York. if the act would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice 
if committed within the state). See also OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2307.382(a)(6) (Baldwin 
1976). 
91 MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN.§ I l-2AOI (Supp. 1976); see also 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. 
Serv. ch. 297. Generally. states may not involve themselves in foreign relations, a power 
delegated to the President and the Congress. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63-64 
(1941). See also Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Thus, any state law intruding 
into foreign affairs would be held to be unconstitutional. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389- U.S. 
429 (1968). 
92 See MD. CoM. LAW CooE ANN.§ 11-2A02(E) (Supp. 1976); 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. 
Serv. ch. 297. 
93 See note 26 supra. Recognizing the boycott as a legitimate exercise of sovereign power, 
some states have declared that provisions requiring that a preference or priority be given to 
Arab products or nations are not considered discriminatory practices. See 1976 Mass. Adv. 
Legis. Serv. ch. 297; OP. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. No. SO 76/54, at 7-10 (Nov. 24, 1976) (provi-
sions with confiscation or war risk clauses are valid and not prohibited by California's 
antiboycott laws because they are a practical reflection of existing relatioaships between 
nations). 
94 See note 90 supra. 
95 MD. CoM. LAW CoDE ANN.§ 11-2A04 (Supp. 1976). 
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will cease. 96 Ignorance of an act may be an excuse. Proof of failure 
to comply with the Maryland law subsequent to an assurance of 
discontinuance, however, is prima facie evidence of a discriminat-
ory practice and such violations will result in maximum penalties.97 
B. Administrative Problems 
The state laws attempt to avoid the problems experienced by the 
federal government in its attempts to administer the EAA. 98 
Nevertheless, New York's Lisa Law, the first antiboycott stat-
ute,99 has been virtually ineffective. 10° For example, the major 
banks in New York continue to honor letters of credit affected by 
the boycott. 101 The states must inevitably confront problems simi-
lar to those confronting the federal government in attempting to 
enforce the antiboycott laws. 
Public officials may attempt to undermine the antiboycott 
scheme. In New York, key officials declared that the Lisa Law is 
detrimental to the state's economy and should be repealed .102 
Subversion by public officials may produce questions concerning 
the actual state policy towards the boycott, foster additional confu-
sion in the business community, encourage compliance to Arab 
demands, and make enforcement more difficult. 103 
The business community remains uncertain as to what activities 
violate the antiboycott laws, and only two states have taken even 
minimal steps to outline the range of prohibited activities. The 
Attorneys General of California and New York have issued 
96 MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § I l-2A06 (Supp. 1976). 
91 Id. 
98 For example, the state antiboycott laws expressly allow private remedies, note 88 
supra, to enhance the state's ability to prevent the discriminatory effects of the boycott. See 
notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the EAA. 
99 See note 68 supra. 
100 See generally Special Report, supra note 72, at I, recommending that guidelines 
concerning the interpretation of the Lisa Law be promulgated, that the New Yori< Human 
Rights Commission enforce the Lisa Law, and that New Yori< support strong.federal 
legislation prohibiting the boycott. Id. 
101 Id. at I & Conclusion at 1-2. See also BANKS AND THE BOYCOTT, supra note 5. 
102 Special Report, supra note 72, at 3. While the "key officials" remain anonymous, the 
tone of the Report indicates that they are capable of upsetting the purpose of the Lisa Law. 
See id. In addition to possible administrative reprisals, the officials could be prosecuted for 
aiding discriminatory practices. The New York Human Rights Commission would have to 
prove that the actions of these officials led to unlawful discriminatory practices by com-
panies who met with these officials. N. Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(13) (McKinney Supp. 1976). 
New York is the only state reporting such activity. Special Report, supra note 72. If other 
states' officials attempt to undermine the antiboycott scheme, the laws would become mere 
resolutions, without effect, thus fostering the boycott. See Bait. Sun, May 13, 1976, at C-1, 
col. 5. 
103 Special Report. supra note 72, at 2. Private suits may prevent the confusion caused by 
such subversion from nullifying the intent of the antiboycott laws. If a business was 
continuing to adhere to Arab demands. private suits could define the prohibited activities 
and revive the effectiveness of the _law. See note 88 supra. 
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guidelines explaining that the laws apply to boycotts other than the 
primary boycott of Israel as well as to banks. 104 More specific 
guidelines would enhance the enforcement of the antiboycott laws 
by preventing businesses from taking advantage of the confusion 
by initiating or continuing compliance with Arab demands. 105 
C. Challenges to the State Antiboycott Laws 
The antiboycott laws raise important questions concerning the 
allocation of governmental power in the federal system. The Con-
stitution confers specific, enumerated powers upon the federal 
government106 leaving broad residual powers to the states. 107 
Where the exercise of governmental powers by the national gov-
ernment conflicts or overlaps with state powers, the initial inquiry 
is the determination of whether or not the federal government has 
acted within the scope of its enumerated powers. 108 Assuming that 
the federal government has acted within the scope of'its authority, 
conflicts are resolved by the doctrine of preemption-. Although the 
precise effect of the preemption doctrine on particular state laws 
and regulations is difficult to predict, the resolution of conflicting 
assertions of authority is relatively easy where Congress has indi-
cated the eX:tent·to which state activity must be displaced. 109 
J. Preemption-In enacting the Export Administration Act of 
J.969, 11° Congress relied on its power to regulate interstate and 
10
• See CAL. OP. ATT'Y GEN. No. SO 76/54 (Nov. 24. 1976) (antiboycott law directed at 
the secondary and tertiary boycotts causes discriminatory effects); Letter from Louis J. 
Lefkowitz. Att'y Gen. of N.Y. to Speaker of the House of the N.Y. Asssembly Stanley 
Steingut (Nov·. 3, 1976) (the Lisa Law applies to banks and other financial institutions) (on 
file with the U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
105 See Special Report, supra note 72. at 2. The Report implies that companies would be 
willing to cooperate with the Lisa Law if they were aware of all its implications. Id. The 
banking _community appears to have reconsidered its opposition to the laws. For example. 
the Bank of America has announced that it would comply with the California guidelines. See 
Wall St. J.,[)ec. 2, 1976, at 16, col. 3. The Bank is complying with the California law, but 
believes that the problem can best be handled by Congress. Statement by the Bank of 
America, Banks and the Boycott. at 3 (undated) (on file with the U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
Guidelines are necessary, a~ canons of construction, before the federal courts will determine 
the constitutional issues involved. See Warden v. Younger, No. C-76-2851 SC (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 31, 1977), at 7 (preliminary injunction dismissed under abstention doctrine) (on file with 
the U.·MICH. J.L. REF.). 
106 U.S. CONST. art. I. 
101 U.S. CONST. amend. X. For an extended treatment of the basic pattern and theory of 
the Constitution with respect to the legislative powers of Congress, the significance of the 
express enumeration of powers, and the meaning of the tenth amendment in relation thereto, 
see I W. CROSS KEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 353-640, 675-708 ( 1953). 
108 Northern States Power Co. ;_ Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, I 146 (8th Cir. 1971), affd; 
405 U .s. 1035 (1972). 
109 Even an express preemption provision, however, does not establish a general preemp-
tion .of all state laws, and a court must consider the legislative history of the statute and the 
congressional purpose in enacting it in order to determine the preemptive scope of the 
provision. See Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 
542-49. . . 
110 Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 2401-2413 
(1970 & Supp. V 1975)). ' 
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foreign commerce .111 Congress has the authority to regulate ex-
ports under the commerce clause, 112 including the lesser authority 
of promulgating regulations to control exports and incidents of 
commerce. 113 
Since Congress has the power to regulate exports and to dis-
courage discrimination,114 the preemption doctrine determines the 
extent to which state power to regulate is displaced. The preemp-
tion doctrine relies upon the supremacy clause of the United States 
Constitution for its validity. 115 In its classic formulation, the rule of 
deci_sion established by this doctrine requires that when a state law 
stands as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution ofthe 
purposes and objectives ofan Act ofCongress" 116 the federal law 
prevails and the state statute is invalidated. This statement is 
deceptively simple because it masks the complexity which is often 
inherent in the crucial determination that the state law constitutes 
an obstacle to the federal policy. Where Congress has explicitly 
articulated the bounds of preemption, the Court's task is relatively 
simple. 117 Where Congress has not enumerated the ex tent to which 
the federal law is intended to displace state law, however, the task 
can be complex. In such an instance, the Court must define the 
appropriate bounds of federal and state authority. 
The EAA does not express an intent to supersede. state anti-
boycott laws and regulations, 118 and no federal policy statement 
111 (!.S. CoNST. art: I. §_ 8, ·cl .. 3, 18 .. 
112 See, e.g., Board ofTnrstees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933); Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824). 
113 California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (upholding the reporting 
requirement in foreign banking transactions); Moon v. Freeman 251 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. 
Wash.), aff d, 379 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1966) (upholding the requirement that wheat exporters 
purchase wheat marketing export certificates). 
11
• See. e.g., Katzenbach v. McKlung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. 
v. Unied States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) .. See also note 59 supra. 
115 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. A determination that a state law is void for obstructing a 
federal statute and is thus preempted rests on this clause. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 
111, 120; 125 (1965). A state law may also be invalidated under other clauses of the 
Constitution in the absence of federal legislation if the Court determines that the mere grant 
of power to Congress excludes state legislation. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 
· U.S. 520 (1959) (state requirement of contour mudguards on trucks invalid under the 
commerce clause); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552-60 (1973) (U.S. CONST. art I., 
§ 8, cl. 8, copyright power does not exclude all state copyright legislation). 
116 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941). The Court has noted its frequent 
adherence to this articulation of the meaning of the supremacy clause. See Goldstein v. 
California, 412 U.S. 546,561 (1973); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649-50 (1971), and the 
cases cited therein. 
117 See Murphy and La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the 
Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 393. 440-45 (1976). 
118 The legislative history of the Export Administration Act, as amended, d~monstrates 
no express intention to preempt state legislation protecting state citizens from discrimina-
tory boycotts. The purpose of the Act is to continue export controls enacted in the Export 
Control Act of 1949, to streamline enforcement of the Act, to improve the compilation of 
trade statistics, and to be used flexibly to protect the Amedcan economy from ·depletion of 
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has been issued in the wake of the recent enactment of the state 
antiboycott laws. 119 It appears that the state laws have not been 
expressly preempted. 
The great majority of Supreme Court decisions on preemption 
have been in cases where Congress has been similarly silent on the 
relation of the federal law to potentially conflicting state laws. 120 
To reconcile the operation of state and federal laws in the absence 
of explicit congressional guidance, the Court has formulated a 
doctrine of "implied" preemption. 121 The inference of preemption 
is drawn either from the existence of a conflict between the federal 
and state laws or from the fact that Congress has so completely 
occupied a particular field as to leave no room for state regula-
tion.122 
Although the standards for finding preemption are easily stated, 
their application to particular cases has been varied. 123 For in-
stance, the decisions display inconsistent treatment of the degree 
scarce resources and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of abnormal foreign demand. 
See S. REP. No. 1024, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 6234; S. REP. No. 92, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CooE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 3085; H.R. REP. No. 524, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1969] U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2705. See also Export Controls, supra note 3, at 96-106. 
119 See note 68 supra. 
120 The fact that the Court has been forced to define the scope of preemption in the 
absence of explicit congressional guidance was noted by Justice Harlan in the context of an 
extensive review of the Court's preemption decisions under the National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-158, 159-168 (1970): 
The principle of preemption that informs our general national labor law was born 
of this Court's efforts, without the aid of explicit congressional guidance, to delimit 
state andfederaljudiciary authority over labor disputes in order to preclude, so far 
as reasonably possible, conflict between the exertion of judicial and administrative 
power in the attainment of the multifaceted policies underlying the federal scheme. 
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 
274, 286 (1971) (emphasis added). Although the Court has only infrequently noted the 
absence of an explicit congressional determination of the scope of preemption, it is nonethe-
less true that almost every preemption case has been decided in this context. See, e.g., 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 4323 (1977) (state commodities weight law was 
preempted because its lax standards conflicted with execution of federal policy); Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade secret law not preempted by 
operation of federal patent law); Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 
(1973) (pervasive scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise preempts local ordinances 
imposing a curfew on jet landings); Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 
132 (1963) (federal test of ripeness of avacados to be marketed does not preempt state test). 
121 Although the term "implied preemption" is an addition to the constitutional lexicon, it 
is a useful addition because it highlights the Court's role in formulating the doctrine of 
preemption. The Court itself has recognized that in the absence of an express congressional 
declaration, it should not infer preemption in the absence of conflict. See, e.g., Huron 
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) (Court will not imply an intent to 
supersede unless actual conflict). 
122 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); 
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297,302 (1961); Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 
U.S. 373, 378-79 (1954); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1947). 
123 For comprehensive and thoughtful analyses of the Court's preemption decisions, see 
Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 51 (1973); Hirsch, 
supra note 169; Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and 
the Bl(J"ger Court, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975). 
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of conflict necessary to support a finding of preemption, 124 and of 
teliance on a broad range of presumptive factors as the basis for an 
inference that Congress intended to occupy a field to the exclusion 
of state authority .125 In one class of cases involving state laws 
designed to protect civil rights, public health, and safety, the Court 
has reiterated the familiar maxim that a federal statute will not be 
deemed to preempt state action unless there is a direct conflict or a 
clear manifestation of congressional intent. 126 
Simultaneous compliance with federal and state antiboycott 
legislation is not impossible. To require this compliance would 
assure the greatest possible opposition to both the secondary and 
tertiary boycotts and their discriminatory effects. For example, if 
banks report boycott requests accompanying letters of credit 
transmittals and refuse to comply with Arab requests declared to 
be discriminatory practices, the policy objectives of both the state 
and federal approaches will be fulfilled. 127 
Other presumptive factors, such as legislative history, the perva-
siveness of the federal scheme of regulation, and the dominance of 
12
• From the beginning of our constitutional history, it has been settled that where a state 
law collides with an Act of Congress, it is invalid under the supremacy clause. Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 10-11 (1824). The Court, however, has not been able to draw a 
clear line between permissible and impermissible degrees of conflict. Compare Perez- v. 
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), with Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470(1974), 
and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. I 17 (1973). 
125 The cases in which the Supreme Court has relied on these presumptive devices of 
congressional intent to exclude state regulation of a given field are legion. See, e.g., City of 
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52 (1941). The Court has also refused to find preemption in the absence of these 
presumptive factors of congressional intent. See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social 
Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
126 See, e.g., New York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 
(1973); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); California 
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949). 
127 The recent concern in the United States over the boycott did not arise because of its 
impact on trade. The boycott's effect was first acknowledged in the investment banking 
sector in March 1974. See ARAB BOYCOTT REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. International 
commerce is highly dependent on the transmittal of letters of credit. A foreign importer who 
wishes to buy goods from an American business will purchase a letter of credit from its local 
bank for the cost of those goods. That bank will then transmit the letter of credit to a 
correspondent American bank, instructing it to pay the specified amount, but only after the 
American bank determines that all the conditions set forth in the letter were met. The bank 
issuing the letter guarantees the reimbursement of money advanced by the correspondent 
American bank and the issuing bank receives a fee based on a percentage of the total dollar 
value of the letter. See generally Harfield, Trade without Tears, or Around Letters of Credit 
in 17 Sections, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 298. Letters of credit issued by foreign banks on behalf of 
Arab importers frequently require American exporters to present documents to American 
correspondent banks certifying that the businesses have not violated provisions of the Arab 
boycott of Israel. BANKS AND THE BOYCOTT, supra note 5, at 5-6. American banks give 
effect to the Arab boycott by agreeing to handle a letter of credit including boycott 
compliance terms. Instead of losing business and being blacklisted, there is evidence that a 
posture of resistance would result in a significant reduction of such requests without an 
accompanying loss of bank business. In a number of instances, resistance by American 
banks to discriminatory requests caused Arab importers to withdraw their demands. Id. See 
also note 10 supra. 
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the national interest in the protection of civil rights, do not pose a 
threat to the anti boycott laws .128 
2. Commerce Clause-The enumerated powers of Congress are 
generally exclusive, permitting only congressional exercise of the 
power. 129 If any state regulation or statute affects Congress' power 
to exercise its exclusive powers, it could be found repugnant to 
that enumerated power and would be invalidated under the supre-
macy clause .130 In determining whether the anti boycott laws may 
be invalidated by this federal prerogative, the initial inquiry con-
cerns the effect of state laws on the federal government's enumer-
ated powers. The attempt to frustrate "agreements" between 
domestic companies and foreign governments, which discriminate 
against state citizens, could affect the federal control over foreign 
commerce as derived from Congress' authority under the com-
merce clause. 131 In addition, the prevention of discrimination 
within a state could be construed as impeding the free flow of 
commerce; companies in states without antiboycott statutes would 
have a competitive advantage in Arab nations that companies 
operating in the antiboycott states would not enjoy. 
A complete discussion of the Court's treatment of the relation-
128 Absent actual conflict between the state and federal antiboycott schemes, preemption 
will not be inferred. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit. 362 U.S. 440, 443 
(1960); note 134 and accompanying text infra. The Court has consistently upheld civil rights 
statutes unless it could "conclude that the purpose of the federal statute would to some 
extent be frustrated by the state statute." Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963). See, e.g., Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. 
Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). 
A bill introduced in the 95th Congress attempts to expressly preempt the state anti boycott 
laws. H.R. 5840, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Zablocki bill), expressly states "(t)he rules 
and regulations issued ... shall preempt and supersede any provision of law or regulation of 
any State" which prohibits participation in the Arab boycott and "no State ... may 
establish, continue ... or enforce any such provision(s)." The Zablocki bill has provisions 
similar to the general state anti boycott· provisions, see notes 74-79 and accompanying text 
supra. However, the strong measures could be diluted by the Executive Department 
actions. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1977, at D-1, col. 5 (Sec. of State Cyrus Vance 
suggesting amendments to the Proxmire Bill which would dilute its effect); Wall St. J., Apr. 
6, 1977, at 4, col. 3 (reporting dilution of the Proxmire bill by the Executive Department's 
misgivings). 
12
• Between the powers which the Constitution denies the states, U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
and those which it reserves to the states, U.S. CoNsT. amend. X, lies a broad range of 
powers capable of being exercised concurrently by the states and the federal government. 
This range of concurrent powers is quite large because, although those powers enumerated 
by the Constitution and delegated to the federal government are generally prohibited to the 
states, the Constitution also delegates to the federal government broad general powers to 
provide for the "general welfare," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. I, and to make all laws 
"necessary and proper," U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 18, to effectuate its other powers. The 
Constitution's delegation to Congress of the power to exercise legislation for the District of 
Columbia is one example of an enumerated power which clearly precludes any state 
regulation. U.S. CON SL art. I. § 8, cl. 17. 
13° For example, in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), the Supreme Court held that 
the Oregon escheat law regulating the rights of heirs to receive property was invalid. The 
Court found that the statute, as construed by the Oregon courts, affected international 
relations, authority committed by the Constitution to Congress and the President. Id. at 440. 
131 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. · 
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ship between the commerce clause and state regulations is beyond 
the scope of this note. 132 Nonetheless, it can be stated that the 
state's police power will be upheld even if its exercise affects 
interstate commerce in some manner, 133 but that state regulations 
substantially impeding interstate commerce will be invalidated. 134 
The Supreme Court has stated that although the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to regulate commerce, it was "never intended 
to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the 
health, life, and safety of their citizens." 135 Therefore, assuming 
that an antiboycott law results in some burdel} on commerce, the 
first question is whether that regulation substantially burdens 
commerce. The Court has uniformly upheld state civil rights laws 
absent a direct conflict with federal statutes. 136 In one instance, a 
state's interest in protecting the civil rights of its citizens has been 
deemed so important that enforcement of the statute involved was 
permitted despite its effect on foreign commerce. 137 Thus, any 
effect on commerce resulting from the enforcement of the an-
tiboycott laws could be considered incidental and not a prohibitive 
burden on commerce. 
Though the antiboycott laws do not constitute a direct burden on 
commerce, the Court has applied additional tests to state police 
power regulation. First, the state regulation must be reasonably 
adapted to the desired objective. 138 The Court has given some 
indication of what it will consider unreasonable in the commerce 
context. For example, in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of 
Detroit, 139 the Court concluded that· a state may not impose a 
132 Fora discussion on the Court's analyses of the commerce clause and state regulations, 
see Dowling; Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940); Shotley, 
Negative lmpliGations of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1936). 
133 See, e.g, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island 
& Pac. R. R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968) (upholding a state law-requiring a full train crew); Cities 
Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (upholding a state order 
requiring company to take natural gas rateably fixed prices although 90 percent of gas went 
out of state); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) 
(upholding state law restricting weights and size of motor carriers). 
134 See, e.g., Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964) (in• 
validating state regulation whjch would have barred interstate milk from a major segment of 
the Florida milk market); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (invalidating state law 
segregating races on interstate buses); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 (J.S. 761 (1945) 
(invalidating state law regulating length of interstate trains). 
135 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960), quoting 
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876). 
136 See, e.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S, 
714 (1963) (upholding state civil rights statute as it applied to an interstate air carrier's 
employment of pilots because it did not place an undue burden on interstate commerce); 
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (upholding state civil rights law as it 
applied to prohibiting discrimination in foreign commerce). · 
137 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948). 
138 South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938). 
139 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960). 
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burden either discriminating against interstate commerce or operat-
ing to disrupt its required uniformity. 
The Court now applies a balancing test to resolve interstate 
commerce questions. 140 Where the state law attempts to achieve a 
legitimate local public interest, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits. 141 Once a legitimate local purpose is 
found, the burden imposed on commerce will be balanced against 
the local interests supporting the legislation in order to determine 
the ultimate question of constitutionality .142 
In applying these tests to the antiboycott laws, it has been held 
that civil rights laws are not an undue burden on commerce. They 
neither discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce, nor do 
they disrupt any required uniformity. Civil rights statutes protect-
ing citizens from discrimination have been upheld by the Court as a 
reasonable means to the ends sought. 143 
Thus, under traditional tests the antiboycott laws appear not to 
impose an undue burden on commerce. This cenclusion is rein-
forced by the result in National League of Cities v. Usery. 144 The 
Court, in overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 145 stated that "insofar as 
the challenged amendments [to the Fair Labor Standards Act] 
operate to directly displace the State's freedom to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they 
are not within the authority granted Congress by [the commerce 
clause]." 146 Although the Court specifically recognized that Con-
gress' power to regulate commerce is "plenary," it held that it was 
not absolute .147 The Court's reluctance to use the commerce 
clause to invalidate state regulation of "traditional" functions 
140 The C',ourt has struck down state regulations by applying the balancing test even where 
the regulation was nondiscriminatory. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines. 359 U.S. 
520, 529-30 (1959). 
141 A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976). quoting Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 
362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960) (invalidating state regulation which would have barred interstate 
milk into Mississippi unless the other states accepted milk from Mississippi on a reciprocal 
basis). 
142 See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines. 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
143 See Colorado Anti-Discrinlination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 
(1963); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S .. 28 (1948). 
144 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
145 392 u .s. 183 (1968). 
146 426 U.S. 833, 852 (emphasis added). 
147 Id. at 836; see also Head v. New M'exico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 
(1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). There are many 
references to Congress' complete authority over foreign commerce, yet the Supreme Court 
has found that a state can regulate foreign commerce where there are local interests 
involved. E.g., Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 
333 U .s. 28 (1948). 
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could possibly be applied to other traditional functions such as the 
-exercise of the police power to prevent discrimination. 
D. Statutory Alternatives to Antiboycott Laws 
A variety of current state statutes, including civil rights and 
antitrust laws, could also be employed to prevent the discrimina-
tory effects of the Arab boycott. 148 State antitrust laws prohibit 
arrangements that restrain or could restrain trade or commerce. 149 
Typically, only "unreasonable" restraints of trade and unjustified 
concerted refusals to deal are prohibited;150 refusals to deal based 
on private political considerations have been considered unjus-
tified .151 Thus, a company victimized by concerted boycott-
inspired actions could use state antitrust laws in seeking relief. 
Many state constitutions152 and civil rights laws153 contain com-
prehensive provisions barring racial and religious discrimination by 
individuals and businesses. In addition, statutory provisions speci-
fically prohibit racial or religious discrimination in employment. 154 
These civil rights laws could be used to prevent discriminatory 
employment practices in American companies, including those 
inspired by the boycott. 
In New York a number of boycott-related discrimination com-
plaints have been brought under various civil rights statutes. Foi: 
example, the Human Rights Commission warned employers that 
they face legal action if they discriminate in employment because 
of foreign pressures. 155 
148 Other statutes include: state restrictions on secondary boycotts, e.g., TEx. REv. C1v. 
STAT. ANN. art 5154f (Vernon 1%7); conspiracy statutes where a person or business induces 
another to breach a contract, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAWS§ 105.00 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 
1976); and statutes prohibiting fraudulent representation and materially deceptive practices 
that would prohibit businesses from complying with an Arab blacklist without informing 
their stockholders or customers, e.g., N. Y. ExEc. LAW§ 63(12) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 
1976). 
149 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 16720 (West 1%9); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 
60-1 (Smith-Hurd 1970 & Supp. 1976); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 340(McKinney 1%8 & Supp. 
1976). 
150 See, e.g., Harlem River Consumers Co-op, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, 
Inc., 408 F. Supp. 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Triple D& E, Inc. v. Van Buren, 72 Misc. 2d 569, 
339 N.Y.S.2d 821, aff'd, 42 A.D.2d 841,346 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1972)·; Big Top Stores, Inc. v. 
Ardsley Toy Shoppe, Ltd., 64 Misc. 2d 894, 315 N.Y.S.2d 897, aff'd, 36 A.D.2d 582,318 
N.Y.S.2d 924 (1970). 
151 Eg., I.P.C. Distributors, Inc. v. Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union, 132 
F. Supp. 294 (N .D. Ill. 1955); see also Note, "Political" Blacklisting in the Motion Picture 
Industry: A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE L.J. 567 (1965). 
152 Eg., CAL. CONST. art. I.§ I; ILL. CONST. art. I,§§ 2, 17, 18, 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I,§ 
11. 
153 E.g .. CAL. C1v1L CoDE §§ 51-54 (West 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 13-1 - 13-4 
(Smith-Hurd 1962); N.Y. ExEc. LAW§§ 290-301 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1976). 
· 
154 E.g., CAL. C1v1L CoDE §§ 51-54 (West 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 13-1 - 13-4 
(Smith-Hurd 1962); N.Y. EXEC. LAW§§ 290-301 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1976). 
155 This warning occurred after an American company fired a Jewish receptionist because 
her job required greeting Arab visitors. See "If you do business in the Middle East ... 
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The statutory alternatives complement the antiboycott laws, but 
it is uncertain whether the alternatives will be effectively used to 
combat the Arab boycott of Israel. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This note has reviewed the state statutory responses to the 
discriminatory effects of the Arab boycott of Israel, examined 
potential challenges to the antiboycott laws, and reviewed existing 
statutory alternatives that can complement the antiboycott laws. 
An analysis of the antiboycott statutes indicates that their effec-
tiveness will not be hampered by the supremacy clause, federal 
preemption, or Congress' authority to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce. If Congress wants to displace the state laws 
with a federal antiboycott statu.te, it will have to expressly preempt 
the state enactments. 
The state laws reflect a growing realization that the boycott 
poses a considerable threat to American commerce and that the 
federal government has moved too slowly to protect American 
citizens from the discriminatory effects of the boycott. In light of 
this, at least six states have taken _steps to protect their citizens 
from the Arab boycott of Israel. If Congress fails to act, other 
states should consider enacting similar antiboycott statutes. 
-Maurice Portley 
Remember certain practices are ILLEGAL," American Jewish Comm .• Apr. 1976, at 16. 
See also N.Y. Times, July 23, 1976, at A-3, col. I (American Jewish Committee filed a 
complaint with the New York Human, Rights Commission against three local banks for 
violating the Lisa Law) .. 
